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Layne: Limitations on Medical Malpractice Damages Pursuant to the Medica

HEALTH CARE

- MEDICAL MALPRACTICE - LIMITATIONS ON MEDICAL.
MALPRACTICE DAMAGES PURSUANT TO THE MEDICAL LIABILITY ACT
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL IN WRONGFUL DEATH CASES. Rose v. Doctors

Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1990).

Rex Rose was admitted to Doctors Hospital and the next day was pronounced dead. According to his widow, Lisa Beth, and his parents, Alton
and Francis, Rex Rose received a fatal dose of the drug Morphine while a
patient at the hospital. Subsequently, Lisa Beth, Alton, and Francis Rose
brought a wrongful death action against the hospital. The jury awarded
$2,825,000.00 to Lisa Beth Rose and $815,000.00 each to Alton and Francis
Rose. However, the trial court rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and the Roses appealed. The court of appeals, in an unpublished opinion, held there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict, but
ordered remitturs to reduce the damages awarded by the jury. The damages
were reduced in accordance with the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act (the "Medical Liability Act"). TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 4590i § 11.02-.03 (Vernon Supp. 1991).
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision, and held
that, pursuant to the Medical Liability Act, the legislature may constitutionally limit medical malpractice damages in wrongful death cases. This decision comes two years after the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Lucas v.
United States in which the court struck down a medical malpractice damages cap as unconstitutional in personal injury cases. 757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.
1988). The majority, however, refused to extend their holding in Lucas to
wrongful death actions.
In recent years, both the number of health care claims and the judgments
awarded have increased by an inordinate amount. See Rose v. Doctors Hosp.,
735 S.W.2d 244, 250 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987) (frequency of claims and
amounts being paid jumped dramatically), aff'd, 801 S.W.2d 841 (Tex.
1990); Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1983) (amount and
number of health care claims directly affect quality of health care). See generally Powers, Torts-Personal,38 Sw. L.J. 1, 28 (1984) (legislative act was in
response to spiraling medical malpractice costs). Due to this situation, a
medical malpractice insurance crisis has developed. See Fein v. Permanente
Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1985). This crisis has had a dramatic,
adverse effect on the availability and cost of medical and health care services
to the public. See Witherspoon, Constitutionalityof the Texas Statute Limiting Liability for Medical Malpractice, 10 TEX. TECH L. REV. 419, 419
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(1979) (crisis manifested by decreased availability of medical care). In response to these problems, state legislatures have enacted statutes which limit
the amount recoverable from physicians and medical facilities. See, e.g.,
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333-2 (West 1989) (limits non-economic damages to
$250,000); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 11.02 (Vernon Supp.
1991) (recovery not to exceed $500,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-25 (1984)
(medical malpractice recovery limited to $750,000). The common goal of
these statutes is to maintain adequate medical and health care services at
reasonable costs. See Massachusetts Indem. Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of
Ins., 685 S.W.2d 104, 112 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, no writ) (legislature
could enact provisions in attempt to ascertain certain goals). Though these
limitations may prove effective for achieving such goals, their enactment
raises important issues regarding the extent to which the legislatures may
infringe upon due process rights.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
that "no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Likewise, the Texas
Constitution provides that "no citizen shall de deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities except by due course of law." TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 19. Moreover, the Texas Constitution provides that "all courts shall
be open, and every person for injury done to him in his lands, goods, person
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 13. This section of the Texas Constitution is generally referred to as the
open courts provision. See McCulloch v. Fox & Jacobs, Inc., 696 S.W.2d
918, 922 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The open courts provision removes the legislature's power to impose a condition that prevents any
chance of recovery for an injury. See Moreno v. Sterling Drug Co., 787
S.W.2d 348, 354-55 (Tex. 1990) (legislature lacks power to make remedy of
due course of law dependent upon impossible situation); Morrison v. Chan,
699 S.W.2d 205, 207 (Tex. 1985) (underlying rationale that legislature has
no power to make remedy impossible); Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 8
S.W.2d 944, 946-47 (Tex. 1932) (common law causes of action cannot be
denied). Thus, the legislature cannot abrogate a party's right to pursue a
common law cause of action unless the legislative basis of the statute outweighs the guaranteed constitutional right of redress. Sax, 648 S.W.2d at
661, 665-66; see also McCulloch, 696 S.W.2d at 918, 924. In essence, the
open courts provision is a component of due process because it is a declaration of the general principle that the courts will be open and provide a remedy to those injured. See Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 663-64.
In addition to due process, the United States Constitution guarantees that
the states shall not deny any individual, within its jurisdiction, equal protection of the law. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Similarly, the Texas Constitution provides that "all free men ...have equal rights, and no man, or set
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of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges
...." TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3. This constitutional guarantee of equal protection simply means that similarly situated individuals will receive similar
treatment under the law. However, the equal protection analysis applied by
the courts recognizes that a state cannot operate unless the legislature has
discretion to pass laws that invariably treat some people differently than
others. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (laws have inevitable effect to treat people differently); San Antonio LS.D. v. Rodriquez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (equal protection does not demand absolute equality).
Under federal equal protection analysis a statutory classification that does
not infringe upon fundamental rights or burden a suspect class is valid, unless the classification is not rationally related to a legitimate state objective.
See Parham, 441 U.S. at 351 (legislative classification valid unless no rational relation to legitimate state purpose). Because the Texas and federal
equal protection clauses are similar in scope, the Texas courts have consistently followed federal equal protection analysis to determine whether statutory classifications violate equal protection. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 846;
Spring Branch I.S.D. v. Stamos, 695 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1985) ("no pass,
no play" rule does not infringe upon fundamental rights); Sullivan v. University InterscholasticLeague, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1981) (equal protection determines whether classifications are reasonable based upon state
purpose).
While at least eight states have addressed the constitutionality of limiting
medical malpractice damages, they have come to differing results. California, Indiana, and Nebraska have all upheld medical malpractice damage limits against constitutional attack. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695
P.2d 665, 682 (Cal. 1985) ($250,000 limit for non-economic damages); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585, 598 (Ind. 1980) ($500,000
limit as total recovery for injury or death to patient); Prendergastv. Nelson,
256 N.W.2d 657, 668 (Neb. 1977) (ceiling of recovery $500,000). However,
other states have held that limits on medical malpractice damages are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 555 P.2d 399, 416
(Idaho 1976) (medical liability act offensive to constitutional prohibition
against special legislation); Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 347
N.E.2d 736, 743 (Ill. 1976) ($500,000 limitation violated equal protection of
state constitution); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980) (recovery limitation does not give adequate compensation); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) ($300,000 limitation violates both state and
federal equal protection provisions); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,
355 N.E.2d 903, 905 (Ohio Misc. 1976) ($500,000 limitation violated equal
protection of both state and federal constitutions). Texas appellate courts
have also struck down as unconstitutional damage caps attempting to limit
medical malpractice damages. See DetarHosp. v. Estrada, 694 S.W.2d 359,
366 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (limitation on damages
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amount infringes on constitutional right to obtain full redress); Malone &
Hyde, Inc. v. Hobrecht, 685 S.W.2d 739, 753 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985,
writ dism'd by agr.) (limits on recovery deny adequate compensation and are
void); Baptist Hosp. v. Baber, 672 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.) ($500,000.00 limitation violates constitutional equal
protection).
In 1988, the Texas Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
damage limitations of the Medical Liability Act. See Lucas v. United States,
757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988). In Lucas, the parents of fourteen month old
Christopher took him to a medical facility for diagnosis and treatment of a
fever and swollen neck. Id. at 688. Christopher was diagnosed as having a
thyroglossal duct, and a Penicillin injection was ordered. A hospital nurse
gave the injection to Christopher in his buttock. Within moments, Christopher's legs became mottled and, although he was treated for an allergic reaction, his legs later became paralyzed. Subsequent tests showed that the
paralysis was due to a lack of blood to the nerves caused by the Penicillin
being incorrectly injected directly into an artery. Id.
Christopher and his parents sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Although they were awarded damages in the district court, the court reduced the award. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the
Medical Liability Act was consistent with the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States Constitution and affirmed the district court.
Id. at 688. The Texas Supreme Court, however, after considering arguments
both for and against the constitutionality of a damages cap, held that the
liability limits under the Medical Liability Act were unconstitutional as applied to malpractice victims pursing a "remedy by due course of law." Id. at
689; see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13. The court in Lucas observed that
Texas courts have long recognized that medical negligence victims have a
common law cause of action to sue for their injuries. Id. at 690. Because the
Medical Liability Act attempted to limit the common law right to recovery
and fails to provide an adequate substitute for the right, the Medical Liability Act violated the constitutional open courts provision.
Justice Gonzalez, joined by Chief Justice Phillips, dissented. Id. at 693.
Justice Gonzalez stated that the open courts provision provides two distinct
guarantees: 1) the right of access to the courts, and 2) the right of redress for
injuries. Id. at 696. Justice Gonzalez noted, however, that the question in
Lucas only involved the right of redress and there was no precedent for interpreting the open courts provision so as to independently protect only one
of the two guarantees. Id. Chief Justice Phillips, in his dissent, stressed that
not every constitutional right triggers equal protection review. Id. at 708.
More specifically, he stated that the right to recover damages for tortious
injury was not a fundamental right, thus, because medical liability limits
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were rationally related to state interests, the Medical Liability Act did not
violate equal protection. Id. at 708-09.
In contrast, the Texas Supreme Court examined a similar situation in
Rose, in which it decided, in a 5-4 decision, that Texas' statutory cap on
medical malpractice damages does not violate the open courts provision
when applied to a wrongful death cause of action. Thus, the court refused to
apply its previous ruling in Lucas, notwithstanding that both state and federal courts have applied the Lucas holding to wrongful death, as well as
injury causes of actions. See Wheat v. United States, 860 F.2d 256, 259 (5th
Cir. 1988) (damages awarded to survivors not excessive); Mercy Hosp. v.
Rios, 775 S.W.2d 626, 637 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1989, writ denied)
(wrongful death medical malpractice suit court held exemplary damages of
$1,000,000 reasonable).
The Rose court admitted being guided by the analysis of the Lucas court,
however, the majority noted that the Rose's cause of action was conferred by
the wrongful death statute as opposed to the common law injury cause of
action in Lucas. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 843; see also, TEX. CIV. PRAC. &
REM. CODE ANN. § 71.001 (Vernon 1988). The court in Rose reasoned that
all causes of action based upon a theory of negligence are common law
claims, but a negligence action would have died with the decedent, Rex
Rose, had it not been kept alive by the legislature in the wrongful death
statute. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845. Reiterating its recent decision in
Moreno v. Sterling Drug Co., the court emphasized that wrongful death actions did not exist at common law. Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845; Moreno, 787
S.W.2d at 366; see also, Witty v. American Gen. Capital Dist., Inc., 727
S.W.2d 503, 504 (Tex. 1987) (wrongful death claim purely creature of statute); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 n.2 (Tex. 1980) (wrongful death
cause of action does not exist at common law). Accordingly, because the
legislature created wrongful death actions, the power to modify such actions
is not abrogated by the open courts provision. See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845;
Moreno, 787 S.W. at 355-56. Since the Roses did not pursue a common law
remedy, the open courts provision did not bar the limitation of damages
imposed by the Medical Liability Act. Id. Thus, the court in Rose put to
rest any attempt to apply the open courts provision to a wrongful death
action.
After discussing the open courts challenge to the Medical Liability Act,
the court turned its attention to the equal protection issue. The court began
by noting that the purpose of the Medical Liability Act, reducing the cost of
health care, was a valid state interest. Rose, 810 S.W.2d at 846. Although
the Medical Liability Act creates a classification, limiting damages for those
individuals injured by medical malpractice, the court found that no fundamental right or suspect classes were involved. See id. Consequently, the
court found that because the limitation of damages was rationally related to
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reducing the cost of health care, the Medical Liability Act did not violate
equal protection. See id.; see also State v. Project Principle,Inc., 724 S.W.2d
387, 391 (Tex. 1987) (rational relationship test for equal protection); San
Antonio Retail Grocers v. Lafferty, 297 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. 1957) (applying rational relationship standard); Stout v. GrandPrairieLS.D., 733 S.W.2d
290, 295 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute must have rational relation to state purpose).
Additionally, the court noted that the Medical Liability Act had been
struck down in Lucas, but explained that in Lucas the statute was applied to
the circumstance of a common law medical malpractice cause of action.
Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 844. The Rose majority rationalized that the effect of
Lucas upon the Medical Liability Act's damages cap was limited solely to
common law medical malpractice claims. Id. Therefore, when the Lucas
court struck the statute's application to a common law cause of action, the
remainder of the statute was still complete and capable of being executed
against wrongful death claims. See id. at 844-45; see also Sharber v. Florence, 115 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. 1938) (courts duty to construe statute and
render it valid); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State, 62 Tex. 630, 633-34
(1884) (what remains independent of what was rejected must stand); TEX.
GOV'T CODE ANN. § 312.013 (Vernon 1988) (court is to ascertain and give
effect to legislative intent).
Chief Justice Phillips, with Justices Doggett, Ray and Mauzy dissented.
See Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 848. Chief Justice Phillips suggested that there was
no legislative intent that the Medical Liability Act's damage limitation provision be severable. Id. at 850; TEX.

REV.

CIv.

STAT. ANN.

art. 4590i,

§ 11.02 (Vernon Supp. 1991) (statute does not distinguish between injury
and death). Furthermore, Chief Justice Phillips noted that the Medical Liability Act had its own internal severability clause, implying that the legislature did not intent a different application of the damage limitation provision
for injury and wrongful death actions. Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 851; see also
Hanks v. City of Port Arthur, 48 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tex. 1932) (statute's plain
terms do not permit judicial intrusion).
The Texas Supreme Court, in Rose, held that Texas' statutory cap on
medical malpractice damages is constitutional as applied to wrongful death
claims. In doing so, the court refused to broaden its previous ruling in Lucas
which held that a cap on medical malpractice damages violated the constitutional open courts provision in personal injury cases. The court distinguished the two decisions by emphasizing that the open courts provision is
only applicable to common law causes of action, and because wrongful death
did not exist at common law, the open courts provision is not applicable.
The court further found that the classification created by the Medical Liability Act does not involve fundamental rights, hence does not violate equal
protection. Thus, after the Rose decision, Texas is left with another legal
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irony: damages can be limited where medical malpractice results in death,
but not where it results only in injury.
Lynn B. Layne
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